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Open research agenda

Research

Original research, peer-reviewed literature review, and data analysis on New Zealand residential property transactions. The NZ academic literature on agent conduct, commission structures, and information asymmetry is remarkably thin. Seventeen specific research opportunities (R1–R17) have been identified in our internal strategy. This page publishes the agenda, invites collaboration, and will progressively release findings.

The NZ evidence gap

Peer-reviewed empirical research on NZ residential real estate agent conduct is essentially absent. The only NZ-specific empirical paper on method-of-sale dynamics (Dotzour, Moorhead & Winkler 1998 on Christchurch auctions) is 27 years old. No NZ replication of the Levitt-Syverson principal-agent paradigm exists. No NZ-specific commission-structure analysis. No paired audit of agent behaviour by language or ethnicity of the vendor.

This absence is not accidental. NZ's small academic market, the real estate industry's tight relationship with its regulator, and the absence of a dedicated homeowner-advocacy research institution have all contributed. Homeowner.org.nz is positioned to change this — by publishing the research agenda openly, by using member-contributed data (with consent, anonymised) to generate the first NZ-specific datasets, and by making the findings available to academics, journalists, and regulators.

Four streams of literature (peer-reviewed)

A · Principal-agent economics

Levitt & Syverson (2008): agents sell their own homes for 3.7% more and hold them 9.5 days longer than client homes. Rutherford, Springer & Yavas (2005) replicate. Bernheim & Meer (2013): when MLS is decoupled from brokerage, using a broker reduces sale price by 5.9–7.7%.

B · Information asymmetry & regulatory capture

Kurlat & Stroebel (2015): insiders systematically time housing markets. Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976): regulatory capture theory. Galanter (1974): repeat players vs one-shot players in regulatory processes. REA 2024/25 Annual Report: 9% adverse finding rate.

C · Behavioural tactics & alternative models

Northcraft & Neale (1987), Bucchianeri & Minson (2013): anchoring in list prices. Genesove & Mayer (2001): loss aversion. Stoll (2022): Germany's Bestellerprinzip backfire — commissions rose after the reform. Buchak et al. (2020) on iBuyers.

D · Legitimation, financing, platform monopoly

Edelman (1992): symbolic compliance — visible structures that signal legality while the underlying conduct continues. Suchman (1995): legitimacy typology. Levy & Schuck (1999, NZ-specific): valuer-client influence. Rochet & Tirole (2003): two-sided platform economics. ComCom v 13 NZ agencies (2016–2020): NZ-specific price-fixing prosecution. Gupta v Rightmove (UK 2026): £1.5bn platform-dominance class action.

Full literature review with 40+ citations, URLs, and NZ-specific commentary is maintained internally in research/strategy/03-literature-review.md and will be published in an accessible form on this site as work progresses.

Thirteen headline data points

Each of these is a peer-reviewed or primary-source fact that anchors a content position on this site. Full list and sources in research/strategy/04-evidence-synthesis.md.

  1. Agents sell their own homes for 3.7% more and hold them 9.5 days longer than client homes (Levitt & Syverson 2008).
  2. Dual-agency sale discount shrank from ~8% to 1.4% after Hawaii mandated disclosure in 1984 (Evangelou & Zumpano 2012).
  3. Homes offering lower buyer-agent commission are 5% less likely to sell and take 12% longer (Barwick, Pathak & Wong 2017).
  4. FSBO sellers get no lower net price than MLS sellers — the 6% commission buys speed, not price (Hendel, Nevo & Ortalo-Magné 2009).
  5. Stanford faculty housing: using a broker reduced sale price by 5.9–7.7% (Bernheim & Meer 2013).
  6. NZ auction premium: 5.9–9.5% on Christchurch homes — 1998 data, overdue for replication (Dotzour et al. 1998).
  7. Experienced agents were anchored by manipulated list prices — and denied it (Northcraft & Neale 1987).
  8. Germany's Bestellerprinzip (2015): commissions rose, consumer loss ~€390m/yr (Stoll 2022).
  9. NZ REA 2024/25: ~9% of licensees complained about received any adverse finding.
  10. US Burnett v NAR (2023): $418M settlement; banned seller-set buyer-agent commissions.
  11. NZ appraisers share drafts with clients; client power shifts appraisals (Levy & Schuck 1999 — NZ-specific).
  12. NZ Commerce Commission prosecuted 13 real estate agencies (2016–2020) for price-fixing over TradeMe listing fees.
  13. UK Gupta v Rightmove (2026): £1.5bn class action; Rightmove ~80% of UK portal time.

Seventeen original research opportunities (R1–R17)

Each opportunity is an area where NZ-specific empirical data does not currently exist. homeowner.org.nz can produce this data through member contribution (anonymised), desk analysis of public NZ sources, or partnership with academic researchers. Full detail in research/strategy/05-content-and-research-roadmap.md.

  1. R1. Principal-agent analysis using REINZ NZ sale data — replication of Levitt-Syverson on NZ market.
  2. R2. REA / CAC regulatory-capture analysis using annual-report data.
  3. R3. NZ paired-audit of agent behaviour by language or ethnicity of the vendor (Chinese-speaking vs English-speaking mystery shoppers).
  4. R4. SAP Agreement "seek independent advice" clause analysis — how it functions as risk-shifting in tribunal decisions.
  5. R5. REINZ + realestate.co.nz + TradeMe market-power analysis under Commerce Act s.36.
  6. R6. NZ caveat-emptor outcomes vs Victoria s.32, California §1102, UK SPIF regimes.
  7. R7. Replicate Dotzour et al. (1998) auction-premium study with 2015–2026 NZ data.
  8. R8. Tender-close deadline effect on final price and post-sale buyer satisfaction.
  9. R9. Audit of REAA-approved training curricula for Cialdini-style influence techniques.
  10. R10. Sunk-cost and buyer follow-through — do buyers who have paid for inspection/LIM walk away less often from bad deals?
  11. R11. Buyer-coaching natural experiment — homeowner.org.nz–coached vs uncoached first-home buyers.
  12. R12. Legitimation-discourse audit — does NZ agency communication use Edelman 1992 symbolic-compliance patterns at scale?
  13. R13. NZ registered-valuer independence and FSBO barriers (extending Levy & Schuck 1999 with modern data).
  14. R14. TradeMe Property price-cost margin analysis — is the platform charging what competition would allow?
  15. R15. Course-of-dealing argument success rate in REA Tribunal decisions.
  16. R16. NZ residential building inspector credential survey — proportion holding LBP / NZIBI, quality-by-credential correlation.
  17. R17. Agent-to-provider fee markup survey — anonymous member-contributed data.

Case studies

Four anonymised case studies of structural patterns observed in NZ residential transactions are published at /case-studies. Each case provides pattern description, legal basis, and response template.

Collaborate with us

If you are an academic researcher, journalist, regulator, or policy professional and would like to collaborate on any of R1–R17 — or propose a related study — contribution channels will open at v1.0 (Q2 2026). In the interim, the strategy files in research/strategy/ are the authoritative reference.